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CLINICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED OUTSIDE OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR ROLE IN
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S
DRUG MARKETING APPROVAL PROCESS
BLAKE WILSON*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. pharmaceutical industry represents a vast and
lucrative sector of the economy. Resistant to the poor economic
climate of the Great Recession, annual revenue from U.S. sales has
Though annual growth has
remained above $300 billion.1
languished recently,2 year-to-year growth will remain a fixture of
this industry as the U.S. economy recovers and the industry looks
to strengthen its global markets.3
* J.D. 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School and former Executive
Editor of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement, as well as
Professor Theodore Ruger for offering his guidance and expertise. Additional
thanks to Dr. Robert Swift and Dr. George Kenna of Brown University for
introducing me to the field of clinical research, and to the Journal of International
Law editorial staff for their diligence. All errors are my own.
1 Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew
5.1 Percent in 2009, to $300.3 Billion (Apr. 1, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/
20100406004405/http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem.a
46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=d690a27e9d5b7210VgnVCM1000
00ed152ca2RCRD&vgnextchannel=41a67900b55a5110VgnVCM10000071812ca2RC
RD&vgnextfmt=default [hereinafter 2009 Pharmaceutical Growth].
2 Compare Ernst R. Berndt, The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: Why Major Growth
in Times of Cost Containment?, 20 HEALTH AFF., 100, 100 (2001) (stating that the
annual growth for U.S. pharmaceutical sales between 1994 and 1999 was 12.8%)
with 2009 Pharmaceutical Growth, supra note 1 (stating that U.S. prescription sales
grew by 1.8% in 2008 and remain at historically low levels, despite a 5.1% growth
rate in 2009).
3 While growth remains at low levels—2.3% in 2010—there is little to indicate
that the market would actually contract at any point. See 2009 Pharmaceutical
Growth, supra note 1 (“Stronger patient demand for prescription drugs
throughout 2009 . . . underscores the resilience of pharmacotherapies in today’s
healthcare equation.”); see also Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports U.S.
Spending on Medicine Grew 2.3 Percent in 2010, to $307.4 Billion (Apr. 19, 2011),
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In order to maintain high economic return, pharmaceutical
companies must continually produce marketable new drugs, or
acquire the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”)
approval to re-market current drugs for a different treatment
purpose. One obstacle to a drug’s profitability is U.S. patent law,
which limits new drug patents to twenty years4 with minimal
opportunities to extend the patent life.5 At the conclusion of the
patent life, the drug becomes “generic,” and it can be produced by
any qualified manufacturer, often being sold at a much lower
price. A second obstacle is the FDA’s drug marketing approval
process, which creates a significant lag between a company’s initial
investment in a drug and the eventual sale of that drug.6 These
initial investments are often substantial and threaten a company’s
viability the longer a drug takes to enter the market. In order to
shorten the delay between investment and return, many
pharmaceutical companies increasingly turn to clinical studies
conducted outside of the United States to supplement, or in some
cases to completely comprise, their New Drug Application
(“NDA”).7 This trend toward using clinical studies conducted
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/menuitem.d248e29c86589c9c30e81c
033208c22a/?vgnextoid=1648679328d6f210VgnVCM100000ed152ca2RCRD&vgne
xtfmt=default (acknowledging industry, but raising concerns over a weakening
consumer base and lost revenue due to patent expiry); but see PwC Report Forecasts
a Golden Era Ahead for Pharmaceutical Companies, but Global Growth Markets Won’t
Guarantee Success, PWC (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/pressreleases/2012/pwc-report-forecasts-a-golden-era.jhtml (projecting a future
industry boom if companies can prove the long-term cost-savings benefits of their
medications in those developed economies experiencing economic hardship,
while at the same time investing in growth markets).
4 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a) (West 2012).
5 See generally WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS 21129, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION (2002),
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments
/RS21129.pdf.
6 See FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 577 (Peter Barton Hutt et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2007) (“[O]n average it now takes 10 to 15 years to develop a new
chemical entity (NCE), from initial chemical synthesis to FDA approval of a [New
Drug Application].”); Seth W. Glickman et al., Ethical and Scientific Implications of
the Globalization of Clinical Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 816, 816–17 (“In 2000, the
cost to develop a new drug averaged $802 million, with time costs accounting for
half of that amount.”)
7 New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.
gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
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outside the United States, also known as foreign clinical trials
(“FCTs”), is attributed to: drastically reduced costs compared to
domestic trials; easier subject recruitment;8 and less regulatory red
tape from foreign governments. Use of FCTs in the drug
marketing approval process has been contentious at times,
prompting questions regarding unethical conduct and data
validity. Proponents of FCTs maintain that the studies are safe and
reliable, and comply with international humanitarian standards.
Critics believe that FCTs, especially those performed in lessdeveloped countries, produce unreliable data and fail to protect
against human rights violations. This Article intends to provide a
historical context for the use of FCTs in the FDA’s drug marketing
approval process, explain the current law regarding the use of
FCTs in the FDA’s drug marketing approval process, analyze
current criticisms of FCTs, and provide some recommendations
about how to minimize these issues.
2.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FDA’S OVERSIGHT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

The history of the FDA begins in the U.S. Patent Office in 1848
when Congress provided funds to the patent commissioner to
“conduct chemical analyses of ‘vegetable substances produced and
used for the food of man and animals in the United States.’”9 Since
then, the organization that we now know as the FDA has
undergone several changes in terms of its Congressional
authorizations.10 Some of the most influential changes were
ed/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last updated
May 18, 2012) (“The NDA application is the vehicle through which drug sponsors
formally propose that the FDA approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and
marketing in the U.S. The data gathered during the animal studies and human
clinical trials of an Investigational New Drug (IND) become part of the NDA.”).
8 Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?: International
Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 181, 190–
92 (2007) (“Americans are increasingly hesitant to participate in [clinical]
experiments. The lack of clinical volunteers has caused a back-up in the ‘pipeline’
of developing drugs.”).
9 Peter Barton Hutt, Symposium on the History of Fifty Years of Food Regulation
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act: A Historical Introduction, 45 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 17, 18 (1990).
10 See id. at 17–18 nn. 16–25 (listing the relevant statutes locating the FDA
predecessor within various parent agencies). The FDA in its current form was not

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

(DO NOT DELETE)

644

8/6/2013

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:3

embodied in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”) of
1938, which provided the FDA with its organic statute and the
ability to assert itself as gatekeeper between the drug industry and
the American public. The 1938 FD&C Act replaced the Federal
Food and Drug Act of 190611 and greatly expanded the powers and
role of the FDA as it attempted to rein in the unwieldy marketing
of drugs in the United States.
The Elixer Sulfanilamide disaster of 1937 was a major catalyst
of the 1938 FD&C Act.12 In 1937, Elixer Sulfanilamide was
approved for use in the United States in pill form, but was also
being sold in its liquid form, which had not been clinically tested
for toxicity.13 Compared to its pill form, the untested liquid was
much more potent, and the drug killed 107 misinformed people as
a result.14 At that time, it was legal for a company to market a drug
in multiple forms without showing that each mode of delivery was
safe and effective. The absence of mandated testing likely lead to
countless injuries, as companies still grappled with the nuanced
intricacies of chemical compounds.
The 1938 FD&C Act required only pre-marketing notification to
the FDA for a new drug,15 but eventually the FDA was given true
gate-keeping authority in the form of pre-marketing approval.16
This change in law occurred after a string of drug related tragedies,
including the thalidomide disaster of the 1950s.17 Congress
responded to the problem in 1962 with the Kefauver-Harrison
formally established by statute until 1988. Id. at 18 n.22 (citing the Food and Drug
Administration Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 3048, 3120 (1988)). See 21 U.S.C.A. § 393
(West 2011) (current version of the Act).
11 See generally Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768
(1906) (establishing federal regulations for all drugs intended for human use).
12 James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14
FLA. J. INT’L L. 261, 341 (2002).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 577 (stating that under the
original 1938 FD&C Act, drug manufactures had to file an NDA with the FDA,
but could begin marketing the new drug if in sixty days the FDA did not
postpone or deny their application).
16 See Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1052 (providing
authority to enjoin a new drug from being marketed in the United States without
prior FDA approval).
17 Gathii, supra note 12, at 334.
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Amendments, which granted the FDA stronger regulatory powers
in the pre-marketing approval stage of a new drug.18 Today,
before a new drug can be marketed in the United States, it must go
through extensive clinical testing to show that it is both safe and
effective under its prescribed and recommended use.19 The
purpose of the requirement is to ensure the public’s safety, but it
also delays the development of new drugs and increases their cost;
rather poetically, the measure’s remedial benefits continue to be
weighed against its unintended side effects.
2.1. The Use of Clinical Studies in the FDA’s Approval Process
To gain FDA approval to market a new drug20 in the United
States, a drug sponsor21 (“Sponsor”) must submit an NDA,22
which, collectively with other application materials, is referred to
as a “marketing application.”23 Among other things, an NDA must
establish that a drug is both safe and effective for its prescribed
use,24 and it must meet this burden through the criteria established
in section 505(d) of the FD&C Act.25 To prove that a new drug is
Id. at 340.
See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2012) (outlining the FDA’s new drug
approval process).
20 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p) (West 2012) (“The term ‘new drug’ means (1) [a]ny
drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective for use under the condition
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling . . . ; or (2) [a]ny drug
[which] has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such
investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such
conditions.”).
21 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2012) (“Sponsor means a person who takes
responsibility for and initiates a clinical investigation.”)
22 First implemented in the 1938 FD&C Act. See New Drug Application (NDA),
supra note 7 (explaining how “the NDA application [sic] is the vehicle through
which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA approve a new
pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S.”). See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.50
(2012) (describing the application process for receiving FDA approval to market a
new drug).
23 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2012).
24 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (West 2012) (requiring an applicant, when filing an
NDA application, to submit “full reports of investigations which have been made
to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use”).
25 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 624.
18
19
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both safe and effective, the drug’s Sponsor must provide
substantial proof from adequate testing reasonably applicable to
show such safety and effectiveness.26 Sponsors demonstrate
substantial proof of safety and effectiveness by conducting clinical
trials.27
The Sponsor, who is often the drug manufacturer, is
responsible for adequately testing a new drug. Clinical studies are
typically performed in a controlled setting utilizing either a “blind”
or “double-blind” design. The purpose of a controlled setting is to
eliminate as much environmental interference as possible so that a
drug’s effects can be isolated. A blind study is one in which
participants are not told what dosage of a drug they are receiving
or, if multiple drugs are being tested, participants are not told
which drug they are receiving. In contrast, a double-blind design
prevents both the participant and the researchers from knowing
how much of a drug—or if applicable, which drug—an individual
participant is receiving. Additionally, in the United States, it is
normal to utilize a placebo control group, meaning that some of the
study participants are given an inert substance in lieu of the drug.28
The purpose of the placebo control group is to set a baseline to
measure the drug’s effects against, and to provide further control
over, environmental interference.

26 21 U.S.C.A § 355(d)(1) (West 2012) (lacking “adequate tests by all methods
reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling” is
grounds for refusing an NDA).
27 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
OEI-01-00-00190, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS: A GROWING CHALLENGE
IN PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 1 (Sept. 2001) (outlining the FDA’s oversight of
new drug research) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS]; see also 21
C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2012) (“Clinical investigation means any experiment in which a
drug is administered or dispensed to, or used involving, one or more human
subjects.”) (emphasis omitted).
28 The use of placebo control groups is often considered unethical by
countries other than the United States and is generally discouraged by the
international community. See e.g. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF
HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
¶ 32 (2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/
17c.pdf.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/5

WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/6/2013 7:55 PM

FDA’S APPROVAL PROCESS

647

A clinical investigator orchestrates and leads the clinical
studies.29 An Institutional Review Board30 (“IRB”) and sometimes
a Data Monitoring Committee31 (“DMC”) also oversee clinical
studies. An IRB is expected to scrutinize study protocols before
testing begins, monitor the progress of a study, maintain records,
and assure clinical testing meets ethical standards including using
a simple and clear patient/subject informed consent form.32 A
DMC reviews the data as a study progresses to ensure that the
drug is not so dangerous that the clinical trial needs to be
terminated, or conversely, that the drug is not so effective that it
would be unethical to withhold the treatment from any participant
receiving an inadequate dose.33
Before initiating clinical trials, manufacturers conduct nonclinical trials34 using only animal subjects and computer modeling.
During the pre-clinical stage, a manufacturer must establish some
basic knowledge about the drug—in particular, what conditions
the drug could potentially treat and toxicity levels.35 If the drug
appears promising after the pre-clinical stage, the Sponsor files an

29 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS: THE USE OF CLINICAL HOLDS FOLLOWING CLINICAL
INVESTIGATOR MISCONDUCT, 2 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126997.pdf (describing the
role of clinical investigators in clinical studies).
30 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2012) (establishing the functions and operations
of an IRB).
31 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., OMB Control No.
0910–0581, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL SPONSORS: ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATIONS OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES (Mar. 2006),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances
/ucm127073.pdf (setting guidelines for when a DMC is needed, how a DMC
should be structured, and scenarios that a DMC may need to manage).
32 See id. at 6 (listing failure to obtain “adequate informed consent” and
falsifying such forms as factors which indicate misconduct); see also 21 C.F.R. §
50.20 (2012) (outlining the minimum requirements of a subject/patient informed
consent form).
33 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 647.
34 The term “non-clinical” or “pre-clinical” trial denotes that the trial will not
involve human subjects, and is to be contrasted with the term “clinical trials”
where human subjects will be used. REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF
PHARMACY 967 (David B. Troy ed., 21st ed. 2005).
35 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 621.
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Investigational New Drug application36 (“IND”) with the FDA in
order to proceed with testing on human subjects. The basic content
of an IND outlines what the drug is, what the Sponsor expects the
drug’s effects will be, and the protocol for the proposed clinical
experiment.37 The FDA has thirty days to put an IND on clinical
hold,38 otherwise the IND becomes effective and the Sponsor may
begin the first phase of clinical testing.39
Phase 140 clinical studies involve administering the new drug to
a small group of healthy human subjects; these studies are
designed to determine the “metabolic and pharmacologic actions
of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing
doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness.”41 If
given approval by the FDA, the Sponsor may progress to Phase 242
clinical studies, which are designed to “obtain some preliminary
data on the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or
indications in patients with the disease or condition. This phase of
testing also helps determine the common short-term side effects
and risks associated with the drug . . . [and] usually [involves]
several hundred people.”43 If the objectives of Phase 2 are satisfied

36 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2012) (“A sponsor who intends to conduct a clinical
investigation . . . shall submit an ‘Investigational New Drug Application’. . . .”).
Note that an IND may be supported by clinical trials conducted under another
IND, or a clinical trial that was conducted abroad and not under an IND.
37 REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACY, supra note 34, at 966–
67. An IND is also the means through which a new drug is exempted from many
pre-marketing regulations so that it can be legally transported across state borders
and tested. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a) (2012).
38 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(c) (2012). See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312.42 (2012)
(stating that a clinical hold prevents investigators from administering the
investigational drug to subjects, and stating the factors that will be considered by
the FDA before imposing a clinical hold).
39 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (2012) (stating when an IND goes into effect). Also,
be aware that the FDA can institute a clinical hold at Phases 1 through 3 of clinical
testing if they determine the study is unsafe or ill designed to achieve its objective.
See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE CDER
HANDBOOK 8-9 (Revised Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter CDER HANDBOOK]; 21 C.F.R.
§§ 312.42(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(ii) (2012).
40 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2012).
41 CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 8.
42 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2012).
43 CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 8.
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then the Sponsor may, with FDA approval, begin Phase 344 clinical
studies, which are designed
to gather [] additional information about effectiveness and
safety [which] is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk
relationship of the drug. Phase 3 studies also provide an
adequate basis for extrapolating the results to the general
population and transmitting that information in the
physician labeling. Phase 3 studies usually include several
hundred to several thousand people.45
3.

FCTS

3.1. Historical Context Surrounding the Use of FCTs in a Marketing
Application
For most of its history, the U.S. government has taken a handsoff approach to drug testing. Ethical rules governing clinical
studies were not formally established until after the Second World
War,46 and prior to the 1950s, there was no duty to root out
unethical conduct in clinical trials.47 Likewise, the notion that an
independent agent should audit study materials to verify that
scientifically proven methods were actually implemented in an
ethical manner, or that data was accurately reported, is also a
recent phenomenon. Yet, these practices eventually became
endemic in the pharmaceutical industry.
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2012).
CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 8–9. The FDA may also require Phase 4
clinical studies, but these are performed as follow-up on a specific issue after the
manufacturer is already permitted to sell the drug to the public. REMINGTON: THE
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACY, supra note 34, at 968.
46 For an in-depth treatment of early ethical codes for human research, see
BRUCE MACFARLANE, RESEARCHING WITH INTEGRITY: THE ETHICS OF ACADEMIC
ENQUIRY 9–20 (2009) (discussing the legacy left by Nazis research at Nuremberg);
PAUL M. MCNEILL, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 37–50
(1993) (discussing the development of ethics regarding human experimentation);
see generally Fazal Kahn, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug
Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877 (2008) (advocating for
exclusion of drug products from the market that are not tested ethically).
47 MCNEILL, supra note 46, at 20–21 (discussing how the Second World War
instigated more clinical trial funding without creating a parallel increase in ethical
review).
44

45
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The business necessity of clinical trials began when the FDA
received limited pre-marketing regulatory power under its organic
statute in 1938 and created what today is known as the NDA
approval process.48 This regulatory shift—requiring businesses to
support their NDA with scientific studies—caused a marked
increase in the number of clinical trials being conducted and a
movement from academically orchestrated trials to privately run
trials.49 Over time, drug regulations became more stringent,
requiring greater statistical proof of safety, and eventually proof of
efficacy. As the regulatory demands rose, so too did the amount of
testing necessary to provide the requisite levels of statistical
certainty.50 In light of the burden placed on applicants, the FDA
should not have been surprised when Sponsors began to include
FCTs to supplement INDs and NDAs. Other factors may also have
encouraged Sponsors to conduct their studies outside the United
States, such as:
funding from a foreign government or
organization to conduct a study in their region; a foreign country’s
regulatory requirement that research on a drug be conducted on
their population before being locally marketed;51 seasonal or

48 New Drug Application (NDA), supra note 7 (providing general information
to the drug industry about the history of and current regulations governing
NDAs); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2012) (governing code for marketing applications
submitted to the FDA).
49 See Jennifer Washburn, Undue Influence, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2001, at 17–
16.
50 Between 1986 and 2005, the annual number of IND submissions to the FDA
rose from slightly less than 350 submissions in 1986 to more than 550 submissions
in 2005, with much of the increase occurring between 2003 and 2005. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: NEW
DRUG DEVELOPMENT, 13 (Fig.3) (Nov. 2006). From 1993 to 2004, annual research
and development expenses for drug marketing approval increased 147%. Id. at
14. However, from 1993 to 2004, the number of NDA submissions increased only
thirty-eight percent and was generally declining from 2000 to 2004. Id. at 15. This
suggests that increases in research and development of drugs have been steadily
outpacing the number of new marketing applications. Id. at i.
51 See, e.g., FL Arnold et al., Exploring Differences in Drug Doses Between Japan
and Western Countries, 87 (No. 6) CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 714,
714 (June 2010) (explaining that Japan is unique in requiring the inclusion of
substantial domestic clinical trial data in new drug application data packages).
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geographic specific diseases;52 and potentially lower costs when
conducting research in less-developed countries.53
Over the past forty years, there has been a continuous increase
in the number of clinical trials moved to locations outside of the
United States, which have been used to supplement marketing
applications submitted to the FDA.54 Within this trend emerged a
subculture of manufacturers that conducted their studies abroad
without seeking FDA approval or supervision via an IND, only to
later submit the study to the FDA in a marketing application.
Though the FDA has never prohibited unregistered foreign studies
from being submitted as part of a marketing application, the FDA
has historically been wary of FCTs in general;55 prior to the 1962
Kefauver-Harrison Amendments, it was uncommon for a Sponsor
to submit FCT data.56 Over time, however, the FDA gradually
came to accept FCTs as equal to their domestic counterparts,57 and
during the 1970s began drafting provisions that would officially
permit the submission of an FCT that was not conducted under an

52 Michael Thoma, Clinical Trials Go Global: Overseas Locations Offer Huge
Benefits—But Also Pose Complex Challenges, MDDI (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.
mddionline.com/article/clinical-trials-go-global.
53 See Carolyne Hathaway et al., Looking Abroad: Clinical Drug Trials, 63 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 673, 674 (2008) (listing “lower overall trial costs” as one of several key
factors for the recent proliferation of drug trials in Central and Eastern Europe).
54 See REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACY, supra note 34, at
650 (contrasting the minimal appearance of FCTs in the FDA’s drug marketing
approval process prior to 1980 with the mass migration of clinical studies to
places outside of the United States during the 1980s). Compare Ileana DominguezUrban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and Human Rights:
The Need to Think Globally, 30 Cornell Int’l L. J. 245, 246 (1997) (reporting that
eighteen percent of studies funded by U.S. companies were being conducted
outside the United States) with DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHALLENGES TO
THE FDA’S ABILITY TO MONITOR AND INSPECT FOREIGN CLINICAL TRIALS, 10, OEI-0108-00510 (June 2010) (reporting that in 2008 an estimated forty to sixty-five percent
of all clinical trials involving FDA-regulated products were being conducted
abroad and that seventy-eight percent of all subjects who participated in clinical
trials were enrolled at foreign sites) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO THE FDA].
55 See John J. Gorski, An FDA-EEC Perspective on the International Acceptance of
Foreign Clinical Data, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 329, 333 (1991) (stating that even after
the 1962 Kefauver- Harrison Amendments to the 1938 FD&C Act, the FDA limited
the use of foreign data to literature review).
56 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650.
57 Id.
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IND to support a Sponsor’s marketing application.58 In 1975 these
provisions were codified in 21 C.F.R. 312.120, which, at the time,
stated that an FCT not conducted under an IND was an acceptable
submission so as long as it was conducted under the ethical
standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki or the ethical
standards of the host country, whichever was stricter.59 This
outright approval opened a floodgate through which the growing
number of FCTs not conducted under an IND could flow into the
drug marketing approval process.60
The FDA has periodically amended 21 C.F.R. 312.120 to
incorporate changes in the Declaration of Helsinki. This occurred
in 1981 when the FDA incorporated the 1975 version and again in
1991 when the FDA set the 1989 Declaration as the statutory floor.61
These revisions, however, applied only to FCTs not conducted
under an IND. When a manufacturer conducts a study outside of
the United States but under an IND, the study, like domestic
studies, must comport with all relevant U.S. laws and FDA
regulations.62 Regardless, this difference may be more substantial
in form than in substance as U.S. laws and regulations have
typically adhered to most provisions of the Declaration of
Helsinki.63

58 See 38 Fed. Reg. 24220 (Sept. 6, 1973) (pinpointing concerns over the lack of
access to data from FCTs as motivation for promulgating the regulation); 40 Fed.
Reg. 16053 (Apr. 9, 1975) (incorporating comments made in response to the
September 1973 proposed regulation).
59 See FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650. See also Gorski, supra note 55,
at 333 (“It was not until 1975 that the FDA accepted foreign clinical studies as
primary evidence of a drug’s safety or efficacy.”).
60 See RITA RICARDO-CAMPBELL, DRUG LAG: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECISION
MAKING 20 (1976) (describing— in 1976—the trend of pharmaceutical companies
moving clinical studies abroad in order to circumvent the IND requirements).
61 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL STUDIES 2 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.
fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm124932.htm.
62 See id. at 1–2 (summarizing the specific FDA regulations that govern the
standards for FCTs as they relate to U.S. standards, and the interplay between
these regulations and the Helsinki Declaration).
63 See id.
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3.2. Analysis of the Movement Abroad
In the 1980s, there was a large migration of clinical studies
leaving the United States.64 The exodus was especially pronounced
for studies investigating compounds in the early stages of
research.65 Three of the most important regulatory factors that
contributed to the movement abroad were: (1) the restrictive
regulations imposed by the FDA on clinical studies conducted
under an IND;66 (2) the recently promulgated FDA legislation that
confirmed FCTs not performed under an IND could be used to
support an NDA or future IND;67 and (3) the lax regulatory
approach of certain foreign governments.68 Purportedly in an
attempt to stem the movement, the FDA fought to streamline its
drug marketing approval process.69 The streamlining provisions
eventually promulgated were limited, however, shortening the
marketing application process by six months at best and allowing
FCTs to be the sole support for an NDA.70 More likely, the FDA
was attempting to ameliorate some of the restrictiveness of the
1962 Kefauver-Harrison Amendments, which created unpopular
delays in the approval process.71 Moreover, no amount of
administrative streamlining could offset two crucial nonregulatory factors that pushed clinical studies abroad: the extreme

FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650.
Id.
66 Id.
67 See Ricardo-Campbell, supra note 60, at 20.
68 See, e.g., FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650; Benjamin Mason Meier,
International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the
Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 532–33 (2002) (describing a
medical “race to the bottom,” in which many African countries minimize
regulations to attract outside medical research); Yevgenia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical
Drug Testing in the Former Soviet Union: Contract Research Organizations as BrokerDealers in an Emerging Testing Ground for America’s Big Pharma, 29 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 425, 427 (2009) (noting how citizens in developing countries, whose
governments oppose stricter regulation on experimental drug trials, make
attractive subjects for clinical researchers).
69 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650.
70 HSS Completes Work on Rules to Speed Approval Process of New Drugs, WASH.
POST, Dec. 12, 1984, at A4.
71 Gorski, supra note 55, at 330–32 (outlining the controversy surrounding the
relatively slow drug approval process in the United States).
64
65
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reduction in cost achieved by conducting studies in less-developed
countries;72 and the larger pool of willing participants.73
Current analysis indicates that a study conducted outside the
United States can reduce the price tag of drug trials to one half74 or
even one tenth75 of what the same study would cost to run inside
the United States. Differing costs for facilities, raw materials,
employee wages, and government licensing are possible causes for
this extreme discrepancy. Additionally, subject recruitment may
be faster in developing countries.76 This last factor serves a dual
benefit to the Sponsor because a larger, more willing subject
population means that larger studies become feasible77 and that
studies can be completed expeditiously. Rapidly completed
studies also lower costs by shortening the period when facilities
and employees are needed, while simultaneously increasing
revenue by bringing the new drug to market earlier.78

FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 6, at 650.
Gregory Lopes, Drug Makers Look East For Testing; Lower Costs, More
Patients in Asia to Help Speed Approval, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at A1; Hathaway
et al., supra note 53, at 674.
74 See Lopes, supra note 73 (discussing the reduced cost of drug trials in
developing countries).
75 See Glickman et al., supra note 6, at 816 (describing the rapid increase in the
number of clinical trials being conducted outside of the United States and possible
causes for the trend).
76 Compare Jennifer Kahn, A Nation of Guinea Pigs, WIRED MAGAZINE, Mar.
2006, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.03/indiadrug.html (describing
how a vulnerable population in India proved highly receptive to clinical drug
testing) with Sonia Shah, Globalization of Clinical Research by the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 33 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 29, 29 (2003) (stating that 1 in 350 Americans
are willing to participate in clinical research). See also Samiran Nundy & Chandra
M. Gulhati, A New Colonialism?—Conducting Clinical Trials in India, 352 New ENG.
J. MED. 1633, 1634 (2005) (discussing reasons why clinical trials are being
conducted outside of Western countries and the implications of this trend);
Hathaway et al., supra note 53, at 674.
77 See Kahn, supra note 76 (comparing drug approval during the 1980s, when
approximately 1,300 volunteers was enough to get approval, with the mid-1990s,
when it was necessary to recruit approximately 4,200 volunteers). Kahn rightly
notes that part of the cause for rising enrollment numbers was the need to show
increased efficacy as drugs became more effective. Id.
78 Lopes, supra note 73. See SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS 5 (2006) (“[E]very
day a new drug remains locked up in development bleeds companies of up to $1
million in potential sales income.”).
72
73

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/5

WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/6/2013 7:55 PM

FDA’S APPROVAL PROCESS

655

Data regarding the trends in FCTs during the 1980s and 1990s
was troublesome to compile because the FDA “[did] not track
NDA information by the location where research was
conducted.”79 Additionally, many FCTs are not conducted under
an IND, so the FDA does not know of their existence.80 Thus, data
compiled on FCTs during those decades comes from Sponsors who
voluntarily conducted their FCT under an IND.81 These studies
may represent only a small portion of overall FCTs during that
time. In an attempt to shed light on this uncharted subject, the
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the
Investigator General (“OIG”) released a 2001 report titled The
Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting
Human Subjects, which gave the United States a limited idea of the
expanding FCT industry. The OIG documented a sixteen-fold
increase between 1990 and 1999 in the number of foreign clinical
investigators conducting studies under an IND.82 “In 1980, just 41
foreign clinical investigators conducted drug research under an
IND. By 1990, that number grew to 271, and by 1999, to 4,458.”83
The report also noted a substantial increase of studies located in
“emerging sites”—so designated because of the limited experience
these countries had conducting clinical research—which included
Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia.84 Studies in these
regions were linked with increased use of contract research
organizations85 (“CROs”) by study Sponsors.86
In its 2001 report, the OIG listed five major concerns regarding
the increase in FCTs: (1) the FDA has minimal information on the
performance of foreign IRBs; (2) not all foreign investigators who
conduct research that is submitted in an NDAs sign an attestation

GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 27, at 6.
Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at i.
83 Id. at 6.
84 Id. at 8. Study Sponsors confirmed that an increasing number of trials were
being conducted in “emerging sites.” See id.
85 Id. at 9 (“Contract research organizations are entities with whom drug
sponsors often contract to manage trials in foreign countries, particularly those in
which sponsors have no offices.”).
86 Id.
79
80
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that they will uphold human subject protections; (3) the FDA
experiences challenges inspecting investigators at foreign sites; (4)
the FDA has limited information on the people and entities
involved in foreign research; and (5) the FDA typically does not
review or discuss with Sponsors the study designs and monitoring
plans of NDA research that was not conducted under an IND.87
The OIG also made five recommendations to the FDA in light of
these concerns: (1) examine ways to obtain information on the
performance of foreign IRBs who oversee clinical trials used to
support an NDA; (2) help inexperienced IRBs build their capacity;
(3) encourage Sponsors to obtain a signed attestation clause from
each foreign clinical investigator, promising to uphold human
subject protections; (4) encourage Sponsors to monitor foreign
studies more closely; and (5) develop a database to track growth
and location of FCTs.88
The FDA viewed most of these
recommendations as favorable. However, the FDA disagreed with
implementing the attestation clause and tracking of FCTs, due to
their lack of authority outside of the United States and the financial
costs of data collection, respectively.89
3.3. Current Law Governing FCTs
When a study is conducted under an IND but is located outside
of the United States, the study still must comport with all relevant
FDA regulations as if it were being conducted within the United
States.90 A Sponsor is not required to conduct an FCT under an
IND in order to use it as support for an NDA or IND.91 The rules
governing the submission of an FCT not conducted under an IND
are codified in 21 C.F.R. 312.120, which was last amended in 2008.92
Id. at 12–15.
Id. at 17–20.
89 Kelly Huegel, FDA Not Keeping Pace with Foreign BiMo Audits, Urged to
Inspect IRBs, Push Sponsors to Do Better Monitoring, 1 BIORESEARCH MONITORING
ALERT 222, Oct. 1, 2001.
90 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2012).
91 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2012).
92 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2008). On August 2, 2012, Rep. Edward
Markey (D-Mass.) introduced to the U.S. Congress the Trial and Experimental
Studies Transparency (TEST) Act, H.R. 6272, 112th Cong. (2012). The TEST Act, in
its proposed form, mandates that the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
within one year of enactment of the Act, amend 21 C.F.R. 312.120 “to require that
87
88
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Prior to 2008, FCTs not conducted under an IND could be
submitted if the study adhered to the principles stated in the 1989
Declaration of Helsinki or the laws and regulations of the country
in which the study was being conducted, whichever provided
greater protection for participants.93 In their 2008 amendments, the
FDA discarded the Declaration of Helsinki/Host Country standard
and in its place instituted a standard called Good Clinical Practice
(“GCP”).94
For the purposes of [21 C.F.R. 312.120], GCP is defined as a
standard for the design, conduct, performance, monitoring,
auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials
in a way that provides assurance that the data and reported
results are credible and accurate and that the rights, safety,
and well-being of trial subjects are protected.95
The FDA justified its shift away from the principles embodied
in the Declaration of Helsinki by explaining that industry members
could be confused as to which version of the Declaration was in
force at a given time, and the FDA did not want to bind the
industry or itself with a document outside its control.96 It would
also be fair to speculate that the FDA was prompted by new
provisions in the 2000 version of the Declaration that discouraged
the use of placebo studies, a mainstay of U.S. clinical research.97
In order to verify that a study abided by GCP, a Sponsor must
provide a supplement explaining the steps taken to ensure

clinical trial information for such a foreign clinical study be submitted for
inclusion in the registry and results data bank . . . as a condition for acceptance of
such study as support for an IND . . . or application for marketing approval . . . .”
Id. § 4. The Test Act was referred to the House Subcommittee on Health on
August 3, 2012 and remains there as of this writing. See Bill Summary & Status
112th Congress (2011–2012) H.R. 6272, LIB. CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d112:h.r.06272: (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
93 Robyn S. Shapiro & Julie M. Rusczek, Client Alert: The FDA’s New Rule on
Foreign Drug Trials, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, June 2008, at 1.
94 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(1)(i) (2012).
95 Id.
96 See Regulation of Overseas Clinical Trials Is Growing, DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY,
Nov. 17, 2008.
97 Id.
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conformity with GCP.98 The FDA provides a list of items that
should be incorporated into this supplement including, but not
limited to, information about the investigator’s qualifications,
information about the facility, and a description of how the clinical
investigator obtained the informed consent of participants.99
Sponsors are also required to show that their FCT was reviewed,
approved, and monitored by an Independent Ethics Committee
(“IEC”),100 which an IRB could satisfy.101 Additionally, the FDA
requires that it be able to validate data from a study through onsite investigations, if the FDA deems it necessary.102
If an FCT not conducted under an IND fails to meet some of the
regulatory requirements of GCP, the Sponsor can apply for a
waiver.103 The FDA will grant a waiver if the Sponsor can satisfy
one of the following conditions: (1) explain why their compliance
with a requirement is unnecessary or unachievable; (2) explain
how the purpose of a missed requirement was satisfied through an
alternative means; or (3) provide an adequate reason to grant a
waiver.104 FCTs not conducted under an IND which fail to meet
the requirements of 21 C.F.R. 312.120 can still have their data
examined by the FDA—usually for the data’s bearing on how a
new drug may be administered safely105—although the data cannot
be used to support an IND or NDA.106

21 C.F.R. § 312.120(b) (2012).
Id.
100 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(1)(i) (2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2012) (defining
Independent Ethics Committee as a panel adequately constituted to protect the
rights and safety of human subjects).
101 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2012).
102 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(1)(ii) (2012).
103 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c) (2012).
104 Id.
105 Shapiro & Rusczek, supra note 93, at 3.
106 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)(2) (2012).
For non-binding FDA guidance on
submission of FCTs not conducted under an IND, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: FDA
ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL STUDIES NOT CONDUCTED UNDER AN IND
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM294729.pdf. This Guidance does
not alter or conflict with any recommendations of this Article.
98
99
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PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CLINICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED IN
LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

While many applaud the use of FCTs as a means to speed up
the marketing approval process for new drugs,107 others have been
skeptical and sometimes staunchly opposed to their use. In 1982,
after the 1975 amendments to the FD&C Act and initial appearance
of the 1980s FCT boom, Representative L. H. Fountain of North
Carolina began holding congressional hearings on proposals that
would allow a new drug to be approved for marketing based
solely on studies conducted abroad.108 During the hearings,
Fountain cited to “several FDA documents that revealed serious
problems with testing in other countries, particularly those that bar
agency medical officers from checking test data.”109 Fountain also
questioned the wisdom of an FDA comment made at that time. In
its comment, the FDA stated that it would continue auditing all
major U.S. human studies offered to support new drug
applications, while at the same time limiting audits of foreign
human studies to only when there was concern about the validity
of the data.110 Fountain feared that this would effectively create a
double standard where foreign studies were considered more
reliable than U.S. studies, as well as give drug companies another
incentive to conduct their research away from the FDA’s
oversight.111
In the 1990s, there was large public backlash against the
pharmaceutical industry in the wake of FCT mishaps, two
examples of which are the Trovan trials in Nigeria112 and the AZT
107 Two prominent groups lobbying for faster drug marketing approval are
drug manufacturers and advocates for the terminally ill. See Washburn, supra
note 49, at 16, 17–18 (attributing the initiatives to expedite the approval process of
new drugs through FCTs to the collective efforts of AIDS activists and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America—PhRMA).
108 Morton Mintz, Administration Seeks to Speed Approval of New Drugs, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 1982, at A2. This proposal was later accepted and is currently
codified in 21 C.F.R. § 314.106 (2012).
109 Mintz, supra note 108, at A2.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See William DuBois, New Drug Research, the Extraterritorial Application of
FDA Regulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 161, 163–64 (2003) (describing the Trovan clinical trials conducted in Africa,
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vaccine trials that took place in Uganda.113 The public’s interest in
the behavior of pharmaceutical companies culminated in certain
stirring publications during 2001, including the Washington Post’s
six part series “The Body Hunters,” the OIG’s report The
Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting
Human Subjects, supra, and the blockbuster novel The Constant
Gardener, which was later adapted to cinema. Even FDA officials at
this time were openly skeptical of FCTs. Antoine El-Hage of the
Center for Drug Division of Scientific Investigation went on record
saying that the FDA was not aware of the existence of most FCTs
prior to submission because they were not being conducted under
an IND.114 El-Hage also stated that the problem was further
complicated because even if an issue was discovered in an FCT not
conducted under an IND, the FDA could only disqualify the study
data, not the foreign investigator who conducted the study.115 This
undermined the FDA’s authority by limiting its ability to ensure
that submitted studies were being run by competent, truthful
individuals.116 El-Hage ended his interview by saying, “Some
countries, I won’t say which ones, have limited clinical research
experience. Some physicians represent themselves as a principle
investigator or as study-coordinator, and they supervise 20 or 30
different sites.”117 The statement implied that the combination of
inexperience these countries had as regulators of clinical trials and
the absurdity that a single investigator could effectively manage so

during which eleven children died, and that travesty’s effect on the public and
FDA).
113 See Meier, supra note 68, at 517–21 (describing briefly the AZT AIDS
vaccine trials in Uganda).
114 Dan Whipple, FDAer Sees No Recognition of Foreign BiMo Audits Yet, 1
BIORESEARCH MONITORING ALERT 2 (Sept. 1, 2001).
115 Id.
116 See United States: FDA Should Improve Oversight of Foreign Drug Trials,
TENDERSINFO NEWS, June 22, 2010 (quoting Dr. Kevin Schulman of Duke
University, saying, “Where data is questionable most of the time, that doesn’t
become public . . . . If someone in Eastern Europe is fabricating data there’s no
database to say ‘Don’t use them for a different clinical trial.’ There’s no way to
know.”). See also Laura Strickler, Report Raises Concern over Foreign Drug Trials,
CBSNEWS (June 22, 2010, 7:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_16220008510-10391695.html.
117 Whipple, supra note 114, at 2.
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many sites should raise suspicion about the data’s validity and
whether the studies were conducted in an ethical manner.
In 2010, two years after the FDA’s most recent amendments to
their FCT regulations, the OIG released its report Challenges to the
FDA’s Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign Clinical Trials118 (“OIG
2010 Report”) as a follow-up to its 2001 report. The OIG 2010
Report took data submitted in 2008 and compiled the information
into a startling analysis of the rapid growth within the FCT
industry and their increasing prevalence in NDA submissions.119
The OIG 2010 Report estimated that forty to sixty-five percent of all
clinical trials involving FDA regulated products were being
conducted abroad,120 and seventy-eight percent of all subjects who
participated in clinical trials were enrolled at foreign sites.121 Of all
the drugs approved for sale in 2008, eighty percent included data
originating from FCTs,122 and ten medicines approved in 2008 were
tested entirely abroad without using a single U.S. subject.123 While
most participants of FCTs were located in Western Europe—which
is known for applying clinical oversight similar to what the United
States applies124—more than twenty-five percent of participants
were enrolled in Central and South American sites.125 The
consolidation of study participants in Central and South America
was unusual because the regions contained only seven percent of
all known foreign clinical sites in 2008.126 This led to the realization
that clinical sites in Central and South America were enrolling
three times as many subjects per site compared to their Western
European counterparts.127
Evidence of the long-term nature of this trend overseas was
offered by the OIG in terms of the number of foreign investigators
See generally CHALLENGES TO THE FDA, supra note 54.
Id. at i–ii.
120 Id. at i.
121 Id. at 10.
122 Id. at ii.
123 Gardiner Harris, Concern Over Number of Foreign Clinical Trials for Drugs
Sold in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A14.
124 Id.
125 CHALLENGES TO THE FDA, supra note 54, at 11–12.
126 Id. at 12.
127 Id.
118
119
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conducting trials abroad—under an IND, which more than
doubled between 1998 to 2008.128 Another trend not cited by the
OIG but which buttresses this conclusion is that while the number
of foreign clinical investigators has been increasing, the number of
domestic clinical investigators has been decreasing.129
Despite the large portion of clinical studies being conducted
abroad, the OIG 2010 Report found that the FDA only inspected
0.7% of all foreign clinical sites in 2008, compared to 1.9% of all
domestic clinical sites. The cost to audit a foreign clinical site is
approximately $40,000, which does not promote an increased
number of investigations.130 Additionally, previous study designs
utilizing a single large subject population at one site are giving
way to using a multisite approach with several sites and smaller
subject populations at each site, making FDA inspections more
troublesome and less useful.131 While not clear, this trend may be
in part due to the increased likelihood of an FDA inspection at sites
with larger subject populations.132
In connection to the FDA’s low inspection rate for foreign
clinical sites conducting studies under an IND, the OIG reiterated
the cautionary call from its 2001 report; the FDA is not aware of the
existence of foreign studies not conducted under an IND and
“therefore cannot conduct inspections while the trials are in
progress.”133 Following dissemination of the OIG 2010 Report
there was public astonishment at the findings and their
implications;134 however, to date no changes have occurred.

Id. at 13–14.
Alan L. Buchman, The State of Clinical Research in America, AM. FED’N FOR
MED. RESEARCH (2010), available at http://www.afmr.org/multimedia/2009/
Clinical-Research-Conference/jim200311.pdf.
130 Harris, supra note 123.
131 Id.
132 CHALLENGES TO THE FDA, supra note 54, at 16.
133 OIG: FDA’s AE Protocol Still Needs Improvement, FDA NEWS: DEVICES &
DIAGNOSTIC LETTER, Mar. 28, 2011.
134 See Harris, supra note 123 (explaining how the OIG 2010 Report caused
public concern when it revealed that a majority of drugs approved for sale in the
United States are tested in foreign countries without adequate controls). Harris
quotes U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) as saying the report “highlights a very
frightening and appalling situation. By pursuing clinical trials in foreign
countries with lower standards and where the FDA lacks oversight, the industry
128
129
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Currently, the problems most associated with FCTs in
developing countries are: (1) the FDA’s lack of knowledge of most
FCTs because they are not being conducted under an IND;135 (2)
the minimal experience and few resources that many of the
countries being used to host these studies can devote to the
regulation such studies require; (3) the human rights violations
resulting from inadequate informed consent136 and exploitation of
vulnerable populations;137 and (4) the concerns over data validity
as a result of lax oversight and conflicts of interest.138
4.1. Ethical Concerns
Most of the criticism levied against FCTs comes from a fear that
human rights violations are being committed when these studies
are performed in less-developed countries. These concerns are
most commonly expressed as follows: (1) subjects of FCTs are
being taken advantage of by the companies running the FCTs; (2)
subjects of FCTs are exposed to heavy risks with minimal benefits;
and (3) subjects in FCTs are not adequately informed about the
risks associated with their participation.
The allegation that FCT participants in less-developed
countries are treated like guinea pigs, while theatrical, is not
outlandish.139 Many new drugs tested in less-developed countries
pertain to ailments afflicting industrialized societies who already
have their basic healthcare needs met; diseases that affect the day-

is seeking the path of least resistance toward lower costs and higher profits to the
detriment of public health.” Id.
135 Whipple, supra note 114.
136 See Meier, supra note 68, at 517–21, 530–35 (explaining how studies
conducted in foreign countries carry human rights implications relating to
informed consent and inadequate regulation because of poor legal enforcement
and lack of financial resources); Laughton, supra note 8, at 208–09 (exploring the
ethical issues and difficulties involved in obtaining informed consent when
performing scientific studies in developing countries).
137 See Laughton, supra note 8, at 208-09 (stating that vulnerable populations
often feel financially coerced into participating in scientific studies for
compensation). See also Kahn, supra note 76 (describing how a vulnerable
population in India was highly receptive to clinical drug testing).
138 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
139 See, e.g., SHAH, supra note 78, at 62–76 (describing the historical
exploitation of human participants in clinical trials); Kahn, supra note 76.
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to-day lives of the impoverished local inhabitants are researched
less frequently.140 When the prominent medical concerns of their
own country are not being investigated, neither the participants,
nor the countries’ other inhabitants, are benefitted in a meaningful
or lasting way by the research. Moreover, even if an experimental
drug could fill a healthcare need in the less-developed country
where it is being tested, pharmaceutical companies have no duty,
and in some cases have a disincentive,141 to sell the drug locally at a
price indexed for the country’s purchasing power. Thus, while a
new drug could benefit local inhabitants, it might not be available
to them because of the high price that pharmaceutical companies
must charge in order to cover their research and development
costs.142
Another way less-developed countries may be harmed by FCTs
is by exposing the participants to excessively high risks143 without
adequate follow-up medical attention.144 Just as the inhabitants of
less-developed countries are infrequently the direct beneficiaries of
drug research conducted within their borders, ethicists assert that
140 Glickman et al., supra note 6, at 819 (detailing that clinical studies
conducted in developing nations are not representative of the illnesses that are
most prevalent in those countries); Shah, supra note 76, at 30 (quoting African
bioethicist Dr. Solomon Benatar as saying “[t]he diseases that are of most interest
are mainly the degenerative diseases—arthritis, obesity, heart disease—the
diseases of people in the developed world . . . .”).
141 When a drug company sells its product for less, or supplies it for free, it
runs the risk of creating a black market for its product. This is because the
recipients receiving the lower price may choose to sell the product to individuals
in wealthier countries at a price that creates a profit to the seller and a savings to
the buyer. This is of particular concern where the initial recipient is a distributor
and not the end user.
142 Harold T. Shapiro & Eric M. Meslin, Ethical Issues in the Design and Conduct
of Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, 345 N. ENG. J. MED. 139, 141 (July 2001)
(describing the lack of access to adequate medicine in developing countries, even
when clinical studies are conducted there).
143 See DuBois, supra note 112, at 195 (“[T]he riskiest experiments are among
the first to be sent abroad.”); Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits
Overseas, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A11986-2000Dec15 (recounting that the FDA denied an American drug
company’s application to test its drug because of health risks, and the company
sent the study to Russia and had it performed there).
144 See Shapiro & Meslin, supra note 142, at 141 (recommending the
establishment of protocols for post-study medical care as a way “to ensure that
the study is responsive to the health needs of the host country”).
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it is unethical to place the dangers associated with untested
medications on a population known by Sponsors to be vulnerable
and more easily influenced. Incentives offered to participants in
less-developed countries can be enticing to the point of being
coercive,145 and may encourage the impoverished to throw caution
to the wind in order to receive compensation that can only provide
their basic needs momentarily.146 The coercive nature of some
FCTs, coupled with potential medical complications, can lead to
unfortunate results.
Specifically, vulnerable members of a
population may expose themselves to experimental substances for
short-lived financial compensation despite the potential for longlasting side effects. Looking to the Trovan case, supra, it is clear
that obtaining necessary medical treatment following clinical trials
can be difficult because of a country’s healthcare infrastructure—or
lack thereof—and because a pharmaceutical company may not be
prepared to respond in a timely manner.147 This issue is further
complicated because pharmaceutical companies are removed from
the situation due to an increased use of CROs.148 Though some
might claim that unforeseen medical complications are to be
expected and should be addressed by legal recourse, the response

145 See Payment to Research Subjects—Information Sheet: Guidance for Institutional
Review Boards and Clinical Investigators, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 18, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126429.htm
(advising IRBs to review the amount and timing of payment to research
participants to ensure neither is coercive, in violation of 21 C.F.R. § 50.20).
146 See Laughton, supra note 8, at 208; but see Kahn, supra note 76 (describing
how Indians participating in a clinical trial are poor enough to make the medical
treatment provided during the study, excluding the experimental drug, amount to
a healthcare windfall); Meier, supra note 68, at 532 (explaining that some
developing countries encourage medical research to supplement their country’s
meager health system); Shah, supra note 76, at 31 (“[C]onsumer health advocates
say that clinical trials are the only way some poor patients can get any formal
healthcare at all.”).
147 See Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in the Balance, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
07/02/AR2007070201255_pf.html (recounting the story of a young Nigerian girl
afflicted with meningitis who died while participating in a clinical trial of
Trovan).
148 See Miriam Shuchman, Commercializing Clinical Trials—Risks and Benefits of
the CRO Boom, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 1365, 1366 (Oct. 2007) (questioning CRO
reporting methods and commenting on the industry’s tendency to internalize
problems).
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fails to account for the lack of a comprehensive court system in
less-developed countries. And, even with access to a semifunctioning legal system, it is unclear to what extent the
governments of such countries will aid their citizens, since it is
often the government who solicits pharmaceutical research.149
Lastly, there is a concern that subjects are inadequately
informed about the risks associated with clinical trial
participation.150 Informed consent is required under 21 C.F.R.
312.120 if an FCT is not conducted under an IND. Yet, medical
ethicists claim that clinical investigators often do not adequately
convey the specific risks associated with participation in an FCT.151
Informed consent has been a cornerstone of clinical research since
the Nuremberg Code, which is widely recognized as the original
international code for bioethics. Primary reasons cited for why
adequate informed consent may not have been given are: the
foreign investigators’ lack of resources to perform their own
background research on a drug; a desire to speed the approval
process along;152 the potential absence in a developing country of
the norm of giving informed consent—to the U.S. standards; the
low level of education in participant population;153 and the fact that
participants may speak a different dialect of a language than the

149 See Stephens, supra note 147 (describing how Nigerian citizens were
unable to seek their government’s help following the Trovan trials in Nigeria for
fear of government retaliation).
150 See Laughton, supra note 8, at 207–08 (speculating whether consent is truly
informed in the developing world due to the limited education of participants as
well as linguistic and cultural barriers); see also Karen DeYoung & Deborah
Nelson, Latin America Is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud Frantic Pace Could Overwhelm
Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/10/01/AR2008100101182.html?sid=ST2008100101390
(describing an experiment that took place at a naval hospital in Argentina, where
prosecutors allege that none of the 137 patients administered the drug actually
gave consent to participate in the experiment).
151 See supra notes 112, 113, 136 and accompanying text.
152 See Laughton, supra note 8, at 207–09.
153 Id. Also, note that in the United States, most informed consent forms must
be written at a sixth grade reading level, thus reflecting a belief that participants
should have at least an understanding equivalent to that of a sixth grader. Id.
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clinical investigator, which can cause the participant
misunderstand the risks involved with taking a drug.154

667
to

4.2. Concerns of Validity
While the actual number of FCTs invalidated during and after
the FDA’s drug marketing approval process is unclear, a legitimate
call for concern can still be raised simply by pointing to the
possibility that invalid FCT data could be submitted without
detection. This concern arises primarily because: (1) FCTs do not
need to be conducted under an IND, which means that they lack
FDA oversight or guidance; (2) foreign IRBs in less-developed
countries may not be as well trained in how to monitor clinical
trials; (3) less-developed countries can be lax in regulating clinical
trials; and (4) there is a lucrative market for FCTs, which could
promote reckless speed, deceptive reporting, or fraud.
The fact that most FCTs are conducted without the FDA’s
knowledge, despite their increasing appearance in the FDA’s
marketing approval process, is at the crux of the issue. Without
adequate guidance from an experienced regulatory body and a
realistic threat that a site may be audited for data validity while the
study is being conducted, there is less assurance that adequate
research techniques are being utilized to ensure validity.155
Auditing a study years after its conclusion provides an incomplete
picture of what took place and risks vital facts being lost or

154 See George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and SelfDeception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297,
314–16 (1995-1996) (explaining the importance of language choice when crafting
an informed consent).
155 See Glickman et al., supra note 6, at 818 (stating that a lack of oversight in
FCTs leads to suspicion over the validity of their data). There are many cases of
data fraud uncovered in FCTs. See, e.g., DuBois, supra note 112, at 163–64
(describing allegations of fraud in the Trovan study in Nigeria, including failure
to obtain consent and faulty record keeping); Shuchman, supra note 148, at 1366
(describing the drug trials for Ketek, which was tested abroad, and the fraud that
was unearthed by the FDA); Maureen Martino, Clinical Trial Fraud Accusations
Rock MannKind ($MKND) Stock, FIERCEBIOTECH (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.fierce
biotech.com/story/clinical-trial-fraud-accusations-rock-mannkind-mknd-stock/
2010-11-05 (reporting allegations that MannKind fabricated patient data at
Russian and Bulgarian testing sites for Afrezza, an inhaled insulin drug).
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forgotten.156 Taking into account the sometimes suspiciously high
occurrence of positive results in clinical trials, the necessity of
having all facts available becomes much clearer. 157
Another factor that could undermine data produced in
developing countries is the lack of a functioning healthcare system.
Many research inquiries involving side effects revolve around
whether a participant sought medical attention while taking the
experimental drug. This line of inquiry arose in more-developed
countries where individuals have relatively easy access to
affordable hospitals and would seek medical attention when
necessary.
In less-developed countries, however, seeking
professional medical attention may not be feasible because
resources are lacking or a participant may be unable to afford the
consultation. Compounding the issue, participants may not want
to seek medical attention or disclose problems to the clinical
investigators because of a fear—which is well founded—that they
will be removed from the clinical trial and forgo their future
compensation for participating. These systemic problems could
minimize the reporting of side effects experienced in a clinical
study, which could result in the continuation of a study that is
unsafe for participants or marketing approval for a drug that is
harmful to consumers.
The use of an IEC is currently a requirement in order for an
FCT to be considered by the FDA for support of an IND or NDA.
However, there is no way for the FDA to effectively evaluate the
competency of the foreign IECs, and the supplemental form that
Sponsors are obligated to provide would appear to offer little
evidence for this point. Particularly in countries where there is less
156 See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Deadly Medicine, VANITY FAIR, Jan.
2011, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/01/deadly-medicine201101 (“By [the time a foreign study is submitted] the [FDA] has lost the ability
to see whether the trials were managed according to acceptable standards, and
whether the data collected was manipulated or fabricated.”).
157 See Shah, supra note 76, at 30 (reporting on a review that stated “99 percent
of controlled trials published in China bestowed positive results upon the
treatment under investigation”); Carl Elliott, The Deadly Corruption of Clinical
Trials, MOTHER JONES, Sep.–Oct. 2010, http://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2010/09/dan-markingson-drug-trial-astrazeneca?page=3 (“A 2006
study in The American Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at 32 head-to-head trials
of atypicals, found that 90 percent of them came out positively for whichever
company had designed and financed the trial.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/5

WILSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/6/2013 7:55 PM

FDA’S APPROVAL PROCESS

669

experience in regulating clinical research, IECs may provide less
than adequate assurance of a trial’s integrity. For instance,
investigation into a recent study conducted in China found that the
study’s design for cardiac research was not effective despite having
been through a local IRB.158 In countries, like China, where the
government typically does not require a study to be reviewed by
an IRB, a lapse in oversight can be expected because the
monitoring boards have limited experience with their task prior to
being contracted by foreign researchers. The lack of experience,
the lack of formal duties, and the lack of an established protocol for
IRBs, or their IEC equivalent, likely lead to significant
shortcomings in the review process of clinical trials.
Finally, there is an obvious financial incentive for lessdeveloped countries, foreign investigators, and CROs159 to
continually acquire new clinical trials.160 As Dr. Marcia Angell,
former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine noted:
There is no substitute for a researcher who is disinterested
in the outcome because it is too easy to bias the results
either consciously or unconsciously. What we are seeing
now is the disappearance of impartial researchers and
institutions . . . . As the economic ties between researchers
and industry become virtually ubiquitous and manifold,
you have to worry about the quality of the research.161
The financial bias problem can create a research culture where
speed, low costs, and obtaining the “right data” from a study can
take precedence over good clinical practice.162 For developing
countries, this can take the form of pandering to Sponsors with
158 See generally Wendy Stough et al., Globalization of Cardiovascular Clinical
Research: The Balance Between Meeting Medical Needs and Maintaining Scientific
Standards, 54 AM. HEART J. 232 (2007) (describing the COMMIT study).
159 See Shuchman, supra note 148, at 1365 (“Annual CRO-industry revenues
increased from about $7 billion in 2001 to an estimated 17.8 billion [in 2007] . . . .”).
160 See Shtilman, supra note 68, at 434–35 n.45 (stating that many CROs and
physicians have a financial interest in the outcomes of drug studies due to
licensing agreements with pharmaceutical companies over scientific discoveries).
161 Washburn, supra note 49, at 20.
162 See supra notes 6 and 78 and accompanying text (discussing the financial
investment in a new drug and the potential profit to be made by bringing a new
drug to market).
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promises of minimal regulatory interference, even though some of
those regulations may be necessary to ensure data quality.163 For
foreign investigators, recruitment compensation for a single study
can be more lucrative than years of ordinary wages,164 creating a
strong incentive to continually land clinical contracts.165 While
these accusations of fraud are highly inflammatory to the medical
community, the merit of the suspicion is strengthened when
recalling that domestic scientific fraud is attempted even under the
more intrusive regulatory conditions of the United States. The fenphen drug fraud case,166 and the case of Dr. Robert Fiddes—who
notoriously enrolled nonexistent patients into more than two
hundred clinical trials in the United States—167 are just two recent
incidences that come to mind.168
CROs should also be mentioned in this discussion, as they have
an ever-increasing global presence. CROs, just like any other
service provider, are in competition to land more contracts in their
industry. The competitive atmosphere may create a “race to the
163 Shah, supra note 76, at 30 (quoting drug expert Kenneth Kaitin from Tufts
University as saying the governments of China, India, and Taiwan bend over
backwards to get drug companies to conduct research and manufacture the
product in their country by providing tax breaks and facilities among other
things); Kahn, supra note 76 (describing the Indian government’s efforts to attract
more clinical research by advertising the quality of its doctors and the poor health
of its citizens); James Cekola, Outsourcing Drug Investigations to India: A Comment
on U.S., Indian, and International Regulation of Clinical Trials in Cross-Border
Pharmaceutical Research, 28 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 125, 126 (2007) (reporting that
India collected $70 million in revenue from clinical trials in 2003, and was
projected to reach $1.5 billion by 2010).
164 Bartlett & Steele, supra note 156, at 60 (“An executive at a contract-research
organization told the anthropologist Adriana Petryna, author of the book When
Experiments Travel, ‘In Russia, a doctor makes two hundred dollars a month, and
he is going to make five thousand dollars per Alzheimer’s patient’ that he signs
up.”).
165 DeYoung & Nelson, supra note 150.
166 See generally Elliott, supra note 157 (discussing the company Wyeth and
their attempt to fraudulently hide negative side effects from their fen-phen trials).
167 See generally Sandy Robertson, Tainted Trials, MED. POST, June 22, 1999,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040221075202/http://www.medical
post.com/mpcontent/article.jsp?content=/content/EXTRACT/RAWART/3524/
25.html.
168 For a general discussion of clinical trial fraud in the United States, see
Marc Buyse et al., The Role of Biostatistics in the Prevention, Detection, and Treatment
of Fraud in Clinical Trials, 18 STAT. MED. 3435 (1999).
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This
bottom” mentality that values results over quality.169
potentially dangerous combination is further exacerbated by
confusion, regarding whether the CROs should report certain
issues directly to the FDA, or to drug manufacturers only.170 The
legal uncertainty has created tension between the three parties and
has probably resulted in some issues going unreported.
Additionally, a lack of minimum credentials for CROs, and a lack
of oversight of these organizations by the Sponsors contracting
them, could create the potential for abuse, in terms of
inappropriate clinical conduct or outright fraud.171
5. RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO MINIMIZE PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH CLINICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED ABROAD
There will always be some minimum amount of time necessary
to properly and ethically research the safety and effectiveness of a
drug. Yet, the FDA must be diligent and efficient in guiding
experimental drugs to the market. To this end, establishing a
better framework for FCTs would accomplish all three of these
goals: safety, speed, and proven effectiveness. This Article
proposes five initiatives to make FCTs safer and the drug
marketing approval process more efficient: (1) the FDA should
promulgate rules that encourage Sponsors to submit a “letter of
possible intent” for FCTs not conducted under an IND; (2) the FDA
should join forces with foreign counterparts to create a more
comprehensive regulatory regime; (3) the FDA should aid in the
creation of an international registry for clinical investigators, IRBs,
169 See generally Shuchman, supra note 148 (noting that, while CROs specialize
in speed and efficiency, their lack of oversight results in questionable
qualifications, accountability, and ethics); Kahn, supra note 76 (stating that India
removed certain regulatory barriers that were in place for the subject’s safety in
order to better court pharmaceutical companies); see also supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
170 Shuchman, supra note 148, at 1366 (stating that CROs typically report
concerns to their drug-company clients, and reporting on two cases where the
drug-companies did not report these issues to the FDA: one involving
suppression of fraudulent results in light of a pending FDA approval application,
and another where the CRO was actively discouraged from contacting the FDA
about a study stating their drug increased risk for several illnesses).
171 Id. at 1367 (discussing the incentives for CROs to encourage the speedy
completion of clinical trials and the hiring of under-skilled and under-experienced
employees to complete the trials).
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CROs, and clinical trials; (4) the FDA should amend their
regulations for disclosure of a clinical investigator’s financial
interest; and (5) the FDA should coordinate with the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to pursue violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by U.S. corporations who
encourage or purposefully facilitate bribery of foreign officials.
5.1. Track FCTs Not Conducted Under an IND Using a “Letter of
Possible Intent”
The OIG recommended that the FDA monitor trends in FCTs
not conducted under an IND and encourage Sponsors to register
their trials under an IND.172 While this recommendation is well
intended, tracking trends in FCTs not conducted under an IND has
logistical problems. To date, there is little information about these
trials precisely because the FDA does not know of their existence,
and thus, cannot track them. The OIG offered no insight on how to
incentivize voluntary participation by Sponsors, except to say that
the FDA should consider implementing legislation to encourage
Sponsors to conduct their studies under an IND.173 Yet, as long as
Sponsors can submit their FCTs without fear of rejection, it is
unclear what incentives could be offered to offset the burdens
associated with IND registration.
As an alternative, the FDA could encourage Sponsors to send a
“letter of possible intent” prior to beginning an FCT that will not
be conducted under an IND. This letter would merely provide
some basic characteristics about the study, and state that the
Sponsor is considering possibly submitting the study to the FDA at
a later date. This would not bring the study under the FDA’s
authority, yet would still inform the FDA of the study’s existence
while it is running, and give the FDA the ability to provide nonbinding suggestions. An incentive for providing the letter could be
an expedited review of that study’s data. Additionally, a higher
level of scrutiny could be held for studies not submitted through
the “letter of possible intent,” or not accompanied by a supplement
that explained good cause for the failure. This higher level of

172
173

CHALLENGES TO THE FDA, supra note 54, at iii and 20–21.
Id. at 21.
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scrutiny could also require a fee from the Sponsor for its
administration to help offset costs associated with the program.
5.2. Begin Collective Efforts Between the FDA and its Foreign
Counterparts
Historically, the FDA has not been keen to accept or supply
foreign regulatory bodies with information about FCTs. Due to the
expansive nature of clinical globalization, and the inability for any
one agency to handle the issue alone, efforts should be made to
increase cooperation between the FDA and their foreign
counterparts.174 By doing so, a more comprehensive picture of the
FCT situation can be drawn, and concerted efforts in monitoring
can create efficient, rather than duplicative, results. Also, the fact
that the United States is geographically far from sites in Western
Europe and Asia makes monitoring by the FDA problematic—
much the same way that Eastern Europe feels about monitoring
clinical trials in South America. Consolidated efforts could
therefore be used to solve the mutual problem of monitoring
clinical sites located far from a country’s geographic location.
5.3. Creation of an International Registry
Registries are crucial for monitoring clinical trials. Without
registries, the FDA, its foreign counterparts, and applicable NGOs
expend excessive amounts of energy performing redundant
background research. Four registration categories that would be
particularly useful to the organizations that monitor clinical trials
worldwide are: clinical investigators, IECs/IRBs, CROs, and
clinical trials. Preferably, this information would be maintained by
an NGO like the World Health Organization, and made available
to anyone interested in researching individuals within a category.
The benefit of this type of reporting system would be the
collaborative effort of multiple countries to keep track of the
organizations and individuals engaged in clinical trials at different
levels of the process. Regulatory bodies would be able to check
information submitted by Sponsors in marketing applications
174 Id.; see GCP Cooperation Begins Between FDA, EMEA, CLINICAL TRIALS
ADVISOR, Aug. 6, 2009 (describing a pilot collaboration project between the FDA
and its EU counterpart).
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against the information provided in the registry, and would be able
to submit their own notes on a registered person or company. A
second benefit of the registry is that it would provide individuals
with a forum to voice concern about poor scientific practices. A
significant problem with FCTs is that watchdog groups, and
individuals harmed by the studies, lack the means to effectively
warn others. The registry could help resolve this shortcoming by
providing a way to publicize specific scientific and ethical
violations that can be substantiated by the facilitating NGO. This
would be accomplished either by updating a registrant’s entry
when violations occur, or—if the entity is not a member—adding
their name to a “black list.” Sponsors would be hesitant to use
entities with a history of misconduct, or entities who were “black
listed,” if they knew the FDA and its counterparts used the registry
in conducting their due diligence.
Funding for the registry could be acquired through an annual
registration fee for registrants, and grants from the United States,
European Union, and Japan.175 Instituting the registration fee
could be accomplished by self-registration, whereupon the
registrant would receive a registration ID. When including itself as
part of a marketing application, the registrant could provide the ID
to make background information readily accessible. If a person or
organization submitted in a marketing application were
unregistered, agencies like the FDA could charge an extra fee to the
Sponsor for the cost of having to perform the research from
scratch. The NGO would be responsible for updating registered
member accounts with current information supplied by regulatory
bodies. Entities may also be encouraged to register if the registry
became a networking tool, where Sponsors looked through profiles
to find future contractors that met their study’s needs.
Clinical investigator,176 IEC/IRB, and CRO registries would be
useful for listing basic information (location, contacts, etc.), as well
as the credentials of these groups, their professional associations,
and any accusations of misconduct. In addition to facilitating
175 Cf. Shah, supra note 76, at 30 (reporting that the United States, the
European Union, and Japan represent eighty percent of the global drug market).
176 Such a registry would be particularly useful because it is unclear whether
the FDA can currently add clinical investigators to its ban list if the investigator is
not conducting studies under an IND. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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verification of credentials by regulatory agencies, groups that
participate in organizing and running the clinical trials could use
the registry to streamline their selection process. Sponsors could
use the list to find CROs with the appropriate experience in certain
geographic areas. Sponsors and CROs could use the registry as a
resource when choosing their clinical investigators, in ensuring
that the investigator has sufficient exposure to the subject matter,
and in selecting the location where the FCT will take place.
Clinical investigators could, in turn, use the registry as a means to
check on CROs that are soliciting them for employment and see if
the organization is associated with studies that did not adhere to
standards of clinical conduct. While it would in no way be a
guarantee for the Sponsor that a chosen clinical investigator,
IEC/IRB, or CRO would not be flagged by a regulatory agency, it
would at least provide another tool in researching the adequacy of
their selection. The usefulness of this approach is evidenced by the
FDA’s recent creation of a domestic IRB registry.177 Knowledge of
existing clinical investigators, IECs/IRBs, and CROs, and creation
of an international identity where deeds can be attached to a name,
is the first step in properly regulating this industry.
Clinical trials may be the most important category of the
registry178 and also would have to function differently from its
counterparts. Unlike the other categories, clinical trials would be a
more fluid listing. They would remain on the registry while in
progress and for two years after completion, to allow for study
verification by regulatory agencies reviewing an NDA or its
equivalent. It would also be wise to forego any sort of a
registration fee for this category in order to promote as many
listings as possible. The goal of this particular registry would be to
promote concerted site inspections by regulatory agencies and
NGOs—like the WHO and Doctors Without Borders—if
177 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE FOR
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—IRB
REGISTRATION (July 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm171256.pdf.
178 An attempt to create a more comprehensive registry of clinical trials,
including those under an IND and those not conducted under an IND, has
recently been introduced to the U.S. Congress by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.)
in the Trial and Experimental Studies Transparency (TEST) Act, H.R. 6272, 112th
Cong. § 4 (2012). See supra note 92.
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authorization can be obtained. This would help alleviate two of
the main causes of low site inspections by the FDA. First,
collective efforts between regulatory agencies and NGOs would
help raise the percentage of FCTs being inspected, while not
increasing budgeting by the FDA. The cost of inspecting an FCT
was listed as a primary reason more inspections are not conducted
by the FDA. Concerted efforts by multiple organizations helps
reduce this problem by ensuring that sites are not investigated
multiple times, and by allowing organizations with closer
geographic proximity to conduct the investigation, thus reducing
costs. Second, a registry of clinical trials would inform relevant
groups of their existence. If the FDA is aware of FCTs, they can
begin to track information about them and utilize that information
to inform and benefit their regulations.
A final nuanced benefit of a clinical trial registry is that it
would bring to the public forum studies that may not have
achieved favorable results for a drug. Drug trials that “fail” may
not be published, nor their results made public, for fear that those
results will weaken an applicant’s efficacy or safety claims.179
Many times, the publication of favorable results occurs after drug
manufacturers carefully design their study to answer a discrete
question—one that they believe will come out favorably for the
company—and thereby limit the amount of negative information
discovered.180 In other instances, however, there is an outright
attempt to prevent negative clinical findings from being

179 Washburn, supra note 49, at 21 (casting doubt on the validity of data
produced by private studies by referencing an article published in the Journal of
the American Medical Association, which concluded nonprofit studies of cancer
drugs are eight times more likely to find unfavorable results than private studies);
Shah, supra note 76, at 30 (reporting on a review that stated “99 percent of
controlled trials published in China bestowed positive results upon the treatment
under investigation.”).
180 Elliott, supra note 157. As Dr. Richard Smith, the former editor of the
British Medical Journal, notes: “The companies seem to get the results they want
not by fiddling the results, which would be far too crude and possibly detectable
by peer review, but rather by asking the ‘right’ questions.” Id. Elliott further
notes: “A 2006 study in The American Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at 32
head-to-head trials of atypicals, [also] found that 90 percent of them came out
positively for whichever company had designed and financed the trial.” Id.
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published.181 International knowledge that a drug is being tested
would provide greater incentive to fully disclose all studies in a
marketing application.
Concerning whether the FDA could legally rely on such a
registry in evaluating marketing applications, it is evident that they
could. The FDA certainly would not rely on this registry as the
sole means of review for entities contained in a marketing
application and would not be bound by any “decision” the NGO
made about a particular entity. Therefore, the FDA could not be
accused of unconstitutionally delegating its authority to another
organization. Also, the FDA has authority from Congress under
the Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
Section 120, to outsource its safety review to third parties. Partial
reliance on another organization would certainly fall within the
scope of this provision allowing the FDA to enlist the assistance of
an NGO for safety reviews. Moreover, utilizing such a registry
would aid the FDA in protecting U.S. citizens from harmful drugs
allowed to enter the stream of commerce, which is the mandate
given to the FDA by Congress in the FD&C Act.
5.4. Amend Regulations Regarding Disclosure of a Clinical
Investigator’s Financial Interest
As of the time of writing, the FDA requires a Financial
Disclosure form for clinical investigators participating in a
“covered study”182 as part of a marketing application.183 The
purpose of the disclosure is to uncover any financial bias that a
clinical investigator may have had while conducting the study,
related to his or her financial relationship with the Sponsor.184 The
disclosure requirement is satisfied by either submitting a form
describing the presence of one or more of the financial interests

181 See id. (discussing the company Wyeth and its attempt to fraudulently
hide negative side effects from its fen-phen trials).
182 21 C.F.R. § 54.2(e) (2012).
183 21 C.F.R. § 54.3 (2012).
184 21 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2012) (“One potential source of bias in clinical studies is a
financial interest of the clinical investigator in the outcome of the study because of
the way payment is arranged (e.g., a royalty) or because the investigator has a
proprietary interest in the product (e.g., a patent) or because the investigator has
an equity interest in the sponsor of the covered study.”).
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listed in 21 C.F.R. 54.4(a)(3), or by submitting a certification
attesting that none of the financial interests apply to a specific
investigator.185 A Sponsor must collect this information for studies
conducted under an IND,186 even if it is unclear whether the study
will be used in a marketing application;187 however, the Sponsor
need not submit the information until the marketing application is
sent to the FDA.188 A Sponsor would also need to supply a
financial disclosure or certification for foreign clinical
investigators—regardless of whether their study was conducted
under an IND—if the study is submitted in a marketing
application.189 However, there is an exemption available for a
Sponsor who, despite due diligence, was unsuccessful in trying to
acquire the information.190
The FDA should amend the Financial Disclosure requirement
in three ways. First, the FDA should require that applications
include the salary paid to the clinical investigator for conducting
the study. The current language of the regulation does not require
disclosure of salary information unless the compensation is tied to
the results of the study.191 However, excessive compensation could
represent a significant source of bias for a clinical investigator,
especially if the Sponsor repeatedly employs the investigator to
run studies. While the FDA should not unnecessarily interfere
with labor contracting, there is a point at which compensation can
21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 312.53(c) (2012).
187 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS,
INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, E.5
(2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM341008.pdf.
188 See id.
189 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS,
INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, F.3
(2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM341008.pdf.
190 21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (2012); FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, F.2 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM341008.pdf.
191 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3)(i) (2012). Excessive compensation could have come
in under disclosure requirement 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3)(ii), but the final regulation
exempted compensation.
185
186
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be recognized as so excessive that it will either purposefully or
inadvertently bias the investigator. The FDA’s examination of
potential compensation bias should also take into consideration the
respective economic realities of developing countries, in which a
salary considered low by U.S. standards might be quite significant
in a less-developed country hosting an FCT.192
Second, in light of the obvious disparity in purchasing power
between more-developed and less-developed countries, the FDA
should also adjust the term “significant payment”193 as it appears
in 21 C.F.R. 54.4(a)(3)(ii). The current definition of “significant
payment” refers to any payments to the clinical investigator—other
than payments for running the clinical trial or other clinical trials—
during the study and for one year after its conclusion, the

192 Interestingly, this recommendation is easier to implement domestically
with the passing and implementation of the Physician Payment Sunshine
Provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009. Within that
provision there is an obligation that “any applicable manufacturer that provides a
payment or other transfer of value to a covered recipient (or to an entity or
individual at the request of or designated on behalf of a covered recipient), shall
submit to the [Secretary of Health and Human Services]” a list of these transfers
which could come from consulting, compensation for non-consulting services,
gifts, travel, royalty or license, travel, and investments among other things.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, Pub. L. 111-148 §
6002(a)(1)(A) (2010). The proposed definition for “applicable manufacturer” has
been broadly written to include all drug, device, biological, or medical supply
manufacturers who are engaged in the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, or conversion of a covered drug, device, biological, or medical
supply for sale or distribution in the United States or a U.S. territory, regardless of
the location of manufacturing or incorporation. 76 Fed. Reg. 78743. Additionally,
“covered recipient” received a broad definition proposal which would include all
physicians except those employed by the reporting manufacturer or by a teaching
hospital. 76 Fed. Reg. 78745. Since clinical investigators are not often employed
by pharmaceutical companies, but rather are contracted to conduct clinical
studies, it is unlikely they will meet the exemption as currently proposed.
Applicable manufacturers will have to annually report all transfers over $10 to a
covered recipient, unless the aggregate of gifts under $10 to a covered recipient
exceeds $100 in a reporting year in which case those gifts will need to be included
as well. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 § 6002(e)(10)(B)(i).
These reporting requirements would make the FDA’s verification of financial
disclosure much easier. If similar requirements were created in other countries, it
would substantially augment the collective capacity of various governments to
uncover financial bias in clinical trials.
193 21 C.F.R. § 54.2(f) (2012) (providing the definition of a “significant
payment”).
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cumulative effect of which exceeds $25,000.194 The FDA should
amend this regulation to reflect the reality that, while $25,000 is a
relatively nominal sum for an American doctor, the same amount
might represent more than the annual salary of a doctor in a less
prosperous country and significantly more than a year’s wages in a
developing country.195 If the idea behind this regulation is to root
out potential sources of bias, the FDA should adjust this amount
based on a sliding scale of where the clinical investigator is
licensed to practice or where the study is conducted. The choice of
whether to use the licensing country or the clinical-site country
should be left for the FDA to decide on a case-by-case basis, so long
as the FDA uses a method that most accurately reflects the
potential for bias. In addition, the FDA should extend the
reporting period in 21 C.F.R. 54 to include a one-year period prior
to the study’s start date in order to provide a more complete
picture of the relationship between the clinical investigator and the
Sponsor.
Lastly, the FDA should take care to review financial disclosures
and limit the ability of Sponsors to exempt themselves from the
requirement. In January 2009 the OIG released a report entitled
The Food and Drug Administration’s Oversight of Clinical Investigator’s
Financial Information (“Financial Information Report”). The report
found that only one percent of all clinical investigators who had
financial information submitted in an approved marketing
application for 2007 listed a single financial interest.196 This figure
comes in stark contrast to a statement in the Journal of American
Medicine that estimated twenty-three to twenty-eight percent of
Id.
See CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34175,
U.S. HEALTHCARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 18 tbl.2
(2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf
(reporting that in 2011 general practitioners in the United States made an average
annual salary of $161,000 USD, while their Mexican counterparts made $21,000
USD on average); David McCoy et al., Salaries and Incomes of Health Workers in SubSaharan Africa, 371 LANCET 675, 677 (Feb. 23, 2008) (reporting the average monthly
income for a doctor in Ghana and Zambia in 2005 as approximately $1,200 USD
and $1,400 USD respectively (annually $14,400 USD and $16,800 USD
respectively)).
196 DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OEI-05-07-00730, THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION’S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS’ FINANCIAL INFORMATION,
14 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter OIG FINANCIAL INFORMATION REPORT].
194
195
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academic investigators had a financial interest in medical
companies,197 suggesting that there may be more overlap. Equally
problematic were the OIG’s findings that forty-two percent of
approved applications were missing some financial information,
with twenty-eight percent of approved applications asserting the
“due diligence” exemption for their failure to acquire the
information, indicating an abuse of this exemption by Sponsors.198
These figures, however, may simply be reflective of a larger
systemic issue created by the FDA’s apathy in monitoring the
Financial Disclosures forms. In its Financial Information Report,
the OIG noted that FDA investigators failed to document whether
they reviewed financial information in thirty-one percent of
approved marketing applications,199 and took no action in twenty
percent of applications where a financial interest was disclosed but
no measures were implemented by the Sponsor to reduce the
potential bias.200 The results of the OIG’s report indicate that FDA
investigators should make a stronger effort to review potential
financial conflicts in marketing applications and tighten the
requirements for Sponsors’ use of the “due diligence” exemption.
5.5. Pursue Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA was passed in 1977 in response to numerous
allegations that U.S. companies and their affiliates were making

197 Justin E. Bekelman, et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 454, 456 (2003).
198 OIG FINANCIAL INFORMATION REPORT, supra note 196, at 17.
Eighteen
percent of those applications utilizing the “due diligence” exemption did not
explain why they were unable to obtain financial information from clinical
investigators. Id.
199 Id. at 18. Of the marketing applications that lacked documented review of
financial disclosures, more than one-third contained a clinical investigator who
disclosed a financial interest. Id.
200 Id. at 20. While taking remedial measures is not required until the FDA
directs the applicant to do so, such measures are prominent—and seemingly
important to the FDA—in this regulation. See 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3)(v) (2012)
(requiring Sponsors to list any steps taken to minimize potential bias from a
financial interest); 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(a) (2012) (listing the three factors that the FDA
will consider when evaluating a financial interest: size of the interest, nature of the
interest, and measures taken to minimize the potential bias created by the
interest).
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improper payments to foreign officials.201 The legislation contains
an anti-bribery provision that enables the DOJ to prosecute U.S.
corporations and nationals who make “improper payments to
foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business.”202 To successfully try a case under the antibribery provision of the FCPA, the DOJ must prove five basic
elements:
1. A payment, either directly or through a third party, of
anything of value
2. to any foreign official, political party, or candidate
3. through the use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce or by the actions of a U.S. person or domestic
concern outside the United States or an act inside the
United States by any other person (other than a U.S.
national)
4. for the corrupt purpose of influencing an official act or
decision of the recipient
5. in order to obtain or retain business or to secure an
improper advantage.203
Within this framework, a U.S. corporation can be held
responsible for the improper actions of contracted third parties.204
This is particularly troublesome for pharmaceutical companies
outsourcing FCTs because of the extensive number of third parties
needed to run a study. CROs and clinical investigators are the
most obvious of these contracted positions.205
As discussed above, one complaint against FCTs is that they
circumvent the regulations of countries where they are being
conducted. One way FCTs may get around regulations is by
offering something of value to a politician or regulatory official in
order to get licensing to perform the clinical study. Examples of

201 Drew A. Harker & Chad E. Miller, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Clinical Trials: A Trap for the Unwary, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 509–10 (2008).
202 Id. at 510.
203 Id. at 510–11.
204 Id. at 511, 514.
205 Id. at 514 (“[T]he risk of FCPA violations grows markedly when a thirdparty agent is introduced.”).
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offers are money transfers to officials, employing officials as
“consultants” for the study, or hiring persons upon
recommendation of the official. These cases would most likely run
afoul of the FCPA’s provisions and could potentially be prosecuted
by the DOJ. Other scenarios are not as cut-and-dry or obvious, yet
still may present an opportunity to reprimand overreaching
parties.
Where a member of a foreign IRB is also a foreign official, the
FCPA could be implicated if the reviewing board as a whole, or the
foreign official in particular, has been transferred something of
value to induce an approval, continued approval, or to stem an
investigation of a study. In this situation, the study would either
be approved or allowed to continue despite conflict with a
country’s regulations for health and safety. The “something of
value” offered could be money, gifts, trips, meals, or any
assortment of things, if the intent was to circumvent regulatory
action. There is even case law to suggest that offers of business
exclusivity could also satisfy the transfer criteria.206 In the present
context, a CRO’s promise to always seek approval from a specific
for-profit IRB could be treated as an offer of business exclusivity.
Another place one may find a foreign official is in the
laboratory or as an investigator at the clinical site. Inducements
given by a CRO or Sponsor to laboratory personnel or clinical
investigators so they will modify, falsify, or hide clinical data in
order to prevent a study from being shut down—or to give better
potential to a marketing application—could also be in violation of
the FCPA. Here, the foreign official working on the study would
be the recipient, and the manufacturing of fraudulent data would
be the corrupt act. The last element of FCPA would either be
satisfied by the continuation of the study—retaining business—or
by gaining an unfair advantage in the marketing approval process.
In addition, a foreign official working directly on the study could
have negative consequences for the U.S. corporation if the
employee induces another official to either give approval for the
study, or prevent government action against a study that is

206

Id. at 511, n.17.
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violating domestic laws or regulations.207 Foreign officials within
the employ of a U.S. corporation are not immune from being a
recipient of an inappropriate transfer, and they will count as a
representative third party of the corporation if they choose to
induce another foreign official to engage in misconduct.208
It should be noted that “payment or offer of something of value
to a foreign official by a CRO, [clinical investigator,] or IRB, with
the purpose of facilitating the success of a clinical trial may
constitute an action that is taken to obtain or retain business,
depending on the circumstances.”209 This could also include
dissuading the government from prosecuting the FCT or
persuading government officials to dismiss or otherwise block the
civil suits of citizens against the FCT. In dissuading litigation, the
business purpose is not as apparent; however, there is case law210
to suggest that this may be in violation of the FCPA because the
requirement of obtaining or retaining business will be read broadly
by the courts.211 Halting litigation that would likely have a
beneficial effect on future drug sales and company stock prices
certainly would appear to fall under this category.
The FDA lacks sufficient funding to effectively police bribery
that may occur during FCTs.212 DOJ prosecution under the FCPA
offers a unique opportunity to both fight bribery and promote
ethical practices in studies connected to U.S. corporations. With its

207 Id. at 517 (“[A] [principle investigator], who himself may be a foreign
official and retained directly by the company to conduct a clinical study, may
corruptly pay or offer to pay something of value to secure the action of another
government official.”). See also United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. CR 021244-SVW (C.D. Cal, Dec. 2002) (accepting a guilty plea by Syncor Taiwan for
bribery of doctors employed in a state-owned hospital).
208 Harker & Miller, supra note 201, at 517 (describing how payments between
government officials do not immunize a corporation from FCPA liability simply
because both parties worked for the foreign government).
209 Id.
210 See U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
211 Harker & Miller, supra note 201, at 516–17.
212 Id. at 521. In 2006, a survey was given to one thousand FDA scientists
asking about different performance aspects of the agency. Seventy percent
believed that the FDA was unable to adequately perform its congressional
mandate. 2006 UCS and PEER Survey of U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Scientists, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_
integrity/fda-survey-questions-and-results.pdf.
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greater resources,213 the DOJ could make the probability of
prosecution a true threat,214 prompting fair competition and
promoting better products.
6.

CONCLUSION

In the upcoming years, experts expect an increase in the
number of clinical trials being conducted in Eastern Europe,
Central and South America, and China and India.215 FCTs are, and
will continue to be, an integral part of the FDA’s marketing
approval process. There is no inherent danger when using FCTs in
the marketing approval process, and when taking into
consideration their lower cost and potential to provide needed
resources to less-developed countries, FCTs can be a laudable
undertaking. However, the safety of those involved and the utility
of the product produced must be ensured. This end can be
accomplished through the collective efforts of the FDA, its foreign
counterparts, and the pharmaceutical industry. A movement
toward accountability occurred in the United States during the last
century, and can be implemented at the global level to the benefit
of all.

213
214
215

Harker & Miller, supra note 201, at 521.
Id. at 519–20.
CHALLENGES TO THE FDA, supra note 54, at 14.
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